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Madubuike-Ekwe: Children in Armed Conflicts

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STANDARDS ADOPTED TO STOP THE
PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN IN
ARMED CONFLICTS

JOSEPH N. MADUBUIKE-EKWE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past century, the face of warfare has changed drastically, making it
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers on the
one hand, and children and adults on the other. lOver the last decade,
two million children have been made orphans, over six million have been
seriously injured, or permanently disabled, and over ten million have
been left with grave psychological trauma. 2 A large number of children
especially young women have been made targets of rape and other forms
•
Doctor of Juridical Science (S.1.D) Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, San
Francisco; LL.M (lie-Ife) 1995; LL.B (Hons) University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1990; Admitted to
practice law in Nigeria (1991) and Republic of Fiji Islands(l997);Lecturer, College of Legal Studies,
Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria (1996-1997); Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Chambers,
Suva, Fiji Islands (1997-1999). I would like to express my appreciation to the Dean and Distinguished Professor Sompong Sucharitkul, Professor Christian Okeke and Professor Warren Small for
their help, guidance and encouragement. I also wish to thank Christopher Jones, Admin. Officer,
LL.M (international Legal Studies) Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California.
I.
See Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers-The use of children as instruments of war, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 499, 509 (2000) discussing that wars have moved from well defined
battlefields to populated areas such as villages.
2.
Id.; see also, Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for
Children and Anned Conflict, at a press briefing on the Protection of Iraqi Children during Conflict
(March 21, 2003), (visited March 24, 2003) <httpII157.l50.184.6/0SRSGCAAClEast.cfm?>; see
also, speech of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the celebration of World day of Peace (Jan. I,
1999); see also, Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y TIMES,
May 9, 2000, at A14, available at <http:/www.crin.org.lresourceslinfodetail.org>.
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of sexual violence as a deliberate instrument of war. At present, there
are over twenty million children who have been displaced by war within
and outside their countries. 3 Some three hundred thousand young persons under the age of eighteen are currently serving in armed conflicts
around the world. 4 Despite the United Nations' achievements with
peacekeeping missions, ethnic conflicts continue to rise and new states
continue to expand the international community. The global community
must work collectively to establish a legal framework regarding the increased use or participation of children in armed conflicts.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the participation of children in armed
conflicts around the world and the various international legal standards
adopted to stop it. The paper will first describe the factors that contribute
to the involvement of children in armed conflicts. It will examine the
relevant international armed conflict (humanitarian) laws and other legal
standards governing the use of children in armed conflicts and their effectiveness. The paper will also discuss the United States position on the
Global efforts to ban the use of children in armed conflicts. Finally, the
paper will discuss the problems of implementation, compliance and enforcement of the various laws governing the use of children in armed
conflicts and make recommendations on how to make the laws more
effective in protecting the children from participating in armed conflicts.
II.

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT

There are two categories of children in armed conflicts: child soldiers
and civilian children. Throughout history, military groups have used
children as soldiers, but in recent years, the deliberate recruitment of
child soldiers has dramatically increased in many global conflicts. 5
Since the end of the cold war, protecting children from grave human
rights abuse has been extremely difficult because the nature of the
world's conflict have become increasingly internalized, localized, and
grounded in nationalistic, ethnic and religious dissension. 6 In these localized conflicts, opposing sides do not distinguish between children and
adults. Militia groups directly target and exploit children rather than

3.
See Otunnu, supra note 2. See also, Graca Machel, Child soldiers: An affront to humanity,
(visited Apr. 2, 2003) <http:/www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm>. discussing that child soldiers are an
affront to humanity [hereinafter Machel Stu~].
4. See Abbott, supra note I.
5. Jd.
6.
See, When Children are Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, analyzing the changing dynamic and method of warfare.
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respecting International Humanitarian Law and protecting the children
from threats of armed conflict. 7
Nowadays, wars are no longer confined to well-defined battlefields,
rather they occur in populated areas where recruiters can easily take children out of buses, schools, and churches and away from their villages. 8
Distinguishing between civilian and combatant becomes difficult as wars
progress because the soldiers take over civilian territory blurring the lines
between civilians and combatants. 9 Military groups employ the battle's
location for their benefit by exploiting children's presumed innocence
through the utilization of children as spies and messengers. 1O Such an
environment fosters mistrust and suspicion of all children, furthering the
difficulty child soldiers face when attempting to reintegrate into their
community.
Technological developments have also contributed to the problem of
child soldiers. Inexpensive new lightweight weapons have made it tragically easy to use children as cannon fodder in modern warfareY In
Uganda, for instance, an AK-47 which is simple enough for a child often
to strip and reassemble, can be bought for the same price as a chicken
and, in Mozambique, for a bag of maize. 12 This newfound ease of arming children, coupled with drugs and alcohol given to children by military leaders, transform these young boys and girls into executioners, assassins and combatants. 13
Military leaders recruit children when there is a shortage of adult soldiers.14 As time passes, increasing casualties and escalating conflicts
lead to a desperate search for new recruits. To alleviate the manpower
shortage, rebel and government forces look to the nation's youth to fill
7. /d. "Wars today are ... fought by warlords who have little interest in the Geneva Convention
and may view even infants as enemies." See also Abbott, supra note I.
8.
See Jimmy Carter, Kid Soldiers, War's most tragic Victim, USA TODAY, June 30,1998, at
II A, discussing factors leading to the increase in Child Soldiers. See also ILENE COHN & GUY
GOODWIN-GILL, CIllLD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICfS (1994).
9. See, Machel Study, supra note 3. See also William Branigin, Gruesome scene: Edgy
Soldiers Fire on Car and Kill Civilians, S.F. CHRONICLE, April I, 2003 at AI, reporting the shooting
by US Marines of a four-wheel drive vehicle full of women and children at a checkpoint in Iraq
during the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq.
10. See UNICEF, Patterns in Conflict: Civilians are now the Target (visited Jan.30, 2003)
<http/www.unicef.org/graca/pattems.htrn>; see also Abbott, supra note I.
II.
See Abbott, supra note 1; see also, Machel Study, supra note 3.
12. See Abbott, supra note 1
13. See Allison Dundes Renteln, The Child Soldiers: The Challenge ofEnforcing International
Standards, 21 WHITIIER L.REv.l91 (1999).
14. See, Machel Study, supra note 9; see also Abbott, supra note I. For example in Angola,
the civil war spanned over thirty years, making volunteers difficult to fmd especially after witnessing
the effects of war on their predecessors.
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their army ranks. 15 The children most likely to become soldiers are from
impoverished and marginalized backgrounds or separated from their
families. 16 Children from wealthier and more educated families are often
left undisturbed or released if their parents can ransom them back. 17
III.

RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Child soldiers are "recruited" in different ways. 18 Some are conscripted,
others are press-ganged or kidnapped and still others are forced to join
armed groups to defend their families. 19 Some join the army voluntarily.
A.

VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT

In most cases, children voluntarily enlist in the armed forces. There are
few, if any, known instances of a military group denying participation to
underage volunteers. There are many cultural, economic, social, ideological and security reasons for volunteering. Often the culture of violence, the desperation for food, the need for security or the drive to
avenge the death of family members prompts such unforced recruitment. 20
Children who grow up in a war-tom environment may feel obliged to
join the military regime out of a sense of loyalty, ethnic grievance, 21 or
merely in an attempt to survive. 22 For these children, the lack of an alternative means to fulfill basic needs such as food and shelter is likely to
lead to their participation in armed conflict. As such, any "choice" these
children may have as to whether or not to enlist is illusory. In some
cases, participating in war is glorified by their culture or held up as a sign
of masculinity. 23

IS.
See. Machel Study. supra note 9; see also UNESCO; Global Perspectives-Human profile
Who
are
child
and
young
adult
soldiers?
(visited
3/25/2003)
cases:
<http:/giniel.sched.pitt.edulginie-crises-links/child soldierslhuman.html> [hereinafter Human profile
cases].
16.
See, Machel Study, supra note 3.
17.

[d.

18.
"Recruitment" covers any means (formal or de facto) by which a person becomes a member of the armed forces or of an armed group, so it includes conscription (compUlsory/obligatory
military service), voluntary enlistment, and forced recruitment.
19.
See UNICEF, Child Soldier Projects; The case of Sierra Leone (visited 2/2512003)
<http:/ginie.sched.pitt.edulginie-crises-links/child soldiers/sierra Leone l.html>, discussing children
who have been abducted and conscripted into the various warring factions.
20. [d., see also Abbott, supra note I.
21.
See UNICEF, supra note 19
22. See, Machel Study, supra note 3.
23.
See Rohan Gunaratna, LITE Child Combatants (visited Jan. 27, 2005)
<http://ourworld.compuserve.comlhomepages/sinhalalchild.htm>, noting that children were attracted
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FORCED RECRUITMENT

Most anned groups recruit children by force. Anned groups use force to
take children from schools, public places and even their own homes. 24
During these abductions, armed groups may compel children to follow
orders by threatening death or by forcing the children to commit atrocities against family members and friends so that they become hardened to
violence. 25
Forced recruitment occurs even in states where legislation is in place to
prohibit compulsory military service before the age of eighteen. 26 The
non-existence of identification papers stating an individual's name and
age, for instance, often facilitates the recruitment of minors. In these
situations, even if minimum age requirements are in place, without identification papers recruiters may evade the law. As evidenced by the
abuses committed in Sierra Leone, forced recruitment often becomes
systematic due to the lack of serious legal ramifications which armed
groups face. 27
The most common form of forced recruitment is called press-ganging,
where armed militia groups or police roam the streets and public gathering places, including school gates, to round up individuals they come
across.28 Forced recruitment may also be accomplished through intimidation to make it appear voluntary. Some children receive military indoctrination in school programs, through the integration of military life
into the general curricula. 29 Due to their young age, children cannot dif-

to the LTIE guerillas by the glamour and perceived respect it was paid by society. See also Abbott,
supra note I, at 4.
24. See AMNESTY INT'L U.K., IN THE FIRING LINE - WAR AND CHILDREN RIGHTS 61(1991)
(hereinafter FIRING LINE) explaining that minors are recruited when the number of adult soldiers is
insufficient. See also Stephanie H. Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of
Sierra Leone Find Justicefor Its Children? 18 AM.U.INT'L L. REv. 537.
25. See FIRING LINE, supra note 24, explaining that armed groups force children to take part in
gruesome initiation ceremonies. See also Bald, supra note 24, describing the recruitment of child
soldiers.
26.
See FIRING LINE, supra note 24, noting that "inefficiency, corruption or structural inadequacies" inhibit the effectiveness of legislation setting an age limit of eighteen for participation in
armed conflicts.
27.
See Bald, supra note 24. See also, Hearings on U.S Ratification of the Optional protocols
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 107th Congress (2002) (testimony of Jo Becker, advocacy Director Children's Rights Division, Human Rights
Watch, discussing the plight of Child Soldiers in more than thirty different world conflicts) (visited
Jan. 31, 2003) <http/wwwlhrw.org/press/2002/03/childsoldiers0307.htm> [hereinafter Becker Hearings].
28. See, Human Profile cases, supra note 15.
29. Id.: see also Bald, supra note 24.
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ferentiate between competing ideologies or fully appreciate the implications of their decisions and actions. 30
C.

EFFECT OF RECRUITMENT

Armed groups treat child soldiers the same as adult recruits and do not
afford children special treatment because of their age. 31 In some cases,
children are viewed as possessing special attributes for high-risk functions. They are forced to undertake more dangerous missions such as
entering mine fields before older troops or being sent on suicide missions.32
Once recruited into the military units, especially those of nongovernmental rebel groups, children face a life of violence and danger
for which they are ill prepared. 33 As combatants,34 they stand to lose
their civilian status and thus the protection that they would normally enjoy under humanitarian law. 35 They are presented to the enemy as legitimate targets of war. 36 The child soldier, like any other member of an
armed force,37 is exposed to the traditional aims of warfare: the death and
disablement of enemy personnel. 38
The consequence of all these practices is death, permanent injury, psychological trauma and social dislocation of the children. 39 If children are
to be spared this fate, they must be excluded from any form of participation in armed conflicts. As will be discussed later, several rules have
been made to achieve this goal. The sources for these rules lie, among
others, in humanitarian law and human rights law. While humanitarian
law has a long tradition of protecting civilians (and by implication children) from the effects of war, its field of application is restricted to
30. See Bald, supra note 24.
31. See id , (discussing how child soldiers in Sierra Leone during their civil war experienced
beatings, forced marches carrying heavy loads, and separation from family).
32. See, Becker Hearings, supra note 27, discussing how children are forced into hazardous
roles.
33. See, Criminalizing the Recruitment of Child Soldiers-Using Children in Armed Conflicts,
in MONOGRAPH No.32: USING CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: A LEGITIMATE AFRICAN
TRADITION?
(Dec.
1998)
(visited
April
6,
2003)
MONOGRAPH
<http:/www.iss.co.zalPubsIMonographs/N032/Ccriminalising.html>
[hereinafter
NO.32].
34.
"Combatants" are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces; see LESLIE C. GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 108 (Manchester Univ. Press, 200 ed., 2000).
35.
"Humanitarian Law" is also called the "Laws of Armed conflict" or the "Laws of War."
36. See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33.
37. ld.
38. ld.
39. See id.; see also, Machel Study, supra note 3.
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armed conflicts. On the other hand, human rights law has the advantage
of being more general since it is applicable at all times and in all places
but until recently, it was not specifically concerned with the problem of
child soldiers. 40
Most of the laws concerning child soldiers are international and not municipal or national laws. 41 Yet, international law governs the relationship
of states, and this is the main obstacle to the effective application of rules
of international law intended to protect the interest of individual human
beings. Those most likely to be responsible for recruiting child soldiers
are rebel groups. Rules of international law, however, are addressed to
states with the result that non-governmental entities such as rebels, irregular militias and armed insurgents are not bound, and the beneficiaries
of the rules - children - have no enforceable rights. 42
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING
CHILD SOLDIERS
There are four kinds of international law in relation to child soldiers:
International Humanitarian Law (otherwise known as the "Laws of
Armed Conflict"), International Human Rights Law, International
Criminal Law and the International Labour Law.43
A.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) , also known as the "Laws of
Armed Conflict," is the body of law which aims to regulate the conduct
of armed conflict by establishing rules regarding methods of warfare and
protection of victims. 44 During medieval times, the general principles of
humanitarian law restricted the ways in which warfare may be conducted. 4s The principle of 'humanity' limited the choice of means to that
most humane; the principle of 'necessity' permitted only a minimal
amount of force to be used; and the principle of 'discrimination' stipulated that only military targets could be attacked.46 Children, together
with the sick, the elderly, and mothers of children (an especially vulner40. See MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33.
41.
"Municipal or National Laws" are the legal systems applied internally by states to those
living within their borders under their national legal systems.
42. See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33.
43. See, Human Rights Watch: Child Soldiers: International Legal Standards Governing Child
Soldiers (visited March 25, 2003) <http:/www.hrw.org.lcampaigns/crp/int-Iaw.htrn> [hereinafter
Child Soldiers].
44. See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33.
45. See Green, supra note 34.
46. Id.
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able category of civilians), derived their greatest measure of protection
from the requirement that civilians and military targets were to be distinguished. 47 Yet even in 17th century Europe, established custom kept children under twelve out of areas of conflict. 48 IHL therefore has afforded
some degree of protection to children, but initially treated them only as
civilians. 49
Humanitarian law first protected children, though indirectly, by promoting family life under the Hague Convention. 50 After WorId War II, the
customs, treaties and declarations governing the conduct of hostilities
were defined, extended and codified in Four Conventions. These, and
their subsequent protocols, are collectively known as the "GENEVA
RULES." They are now synonymous with Humanitarian Law. 51 The
Geneva Conventions did not set out to guarantee non-combatants immunity from violence of war. Rather, the goal was to protect certain categories of persons who fell into the hands of an adversary during an armed
conflict. 52 The Geneva Convention applies only to conflicts of international character. 53 With regard to non-international armed conflicts, Article 3, which is common to all four of the Conventions extends certain
minimum humanitarian protection to non-combatants and to the sick and
the wounded. 54 Common Article 3 relates to treatment of noncombatants and does not explicitly deal with the issue of child combatants. Consequently, international law did not address the question of
children participating in war.
To address this question, two 'Additional Protocols' were adopted in
1977 to supplement the four Geneva Conventions. The two protocols
finally dealt directly with the role of children in armed conflicts, regulat-

47.
See Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and
annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.l8, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No.539. [hereinafter Hague Convention] see also Hans-Peter Gasser, The u.s. Decision
Not to RatifY Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims: An Appeal for
Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 912,915 (1987).
48.
See MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33.
49.
See JENNY KUPER, INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING CHILD CiVILIANS IN ARMED
CONFLICf, chap. 4 (1997).
50.
See Hague Convention, supra note 47.
51.
See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33.
52.
See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.12,
1949, No.973, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
53.
"Conflicts of International Character" refer to wars, or armed conflicts between states
through the medium of their armed forces. See, Green, supra note 34 at 54.
54.
Common Article 3 does not specifY the Law of War for non-international Conflict and
does not contain a "grave breaches" provision mandating criminal punishment.
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ing this phenomenon for the first time. ss Article 77 of Protocol I provides that:
(2) The parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in
order that children who have not attained the age of 15 years do
not take a direct part in hostilities and in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting
among those persons who have attained the age of 15 years but
who have not attained the age of 18 years, the parties to the conflict shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.
(3) If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2,
Children who have not attained the age of 15 years take a direct
part in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse party, they
shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by
this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war. S6
This protocol has been criticized for requiring States to "take all feasible
measures" to protect children from warfare. Such a low standard will
allow a state party considerable freedom to evade the general prohibition.
No minimum age limit was attached to the term "children" in Article
77(2). This omission left an ambiguity that states could exploit to their
advantage. S7 The Parties to the Protocol were obliged only to ensure that
children did not take a "direct" part in hostilities. Qualifying the nature
of participation in this manner fostered ambiguity and invited subjective
interpretation by states. 58
It is also futile to protect children only in cases of direct participation.

Recent evidence shows that children who start their military engagement
in a support role usually become active combatants. 59 Furthermore, permitting any degree of participation undermines the principle at stake.
Whether children participate directly or indirectly, they are in danger. 60
Even low level involvement, such as a messenger or menial camp attendant, exposes the individual to attack by the enemy. Association with a

55.
See Renteln, supra note 13; see also MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33.
56.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 V.N.T.S. 3, 161.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol i); see also Renteln, supra note 13; see
MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33.
57.
See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33.
58.
Id.
59.
See R. Brett, Child Soldiers: Law, Politics and Practice, 4 iNT'L J. CHILDREN'S RTS 115,
124, (Netherlands 1996).
60.
See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33.
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war effort means that if captured, a child could be treated as aspy, saboteur or illegal combatant. 61
To avoid the last possibility, paragraph (3) was added to Article 77.
Without this addition, children under 15 who participate directly in hostilities would stand to lose their entitlement to prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention. Hence Article 77(3) provided that for
the purposes of the Fourth Convention, such children would still be
deemed "protected persons."62
Although Additional Protocol II, like Protocol I, was intended to supplement the Common Article 3 provision in the four Geneva Conventions on "non-international" armed conflicts, it also applies to conflicts
not covered in Protocol IY These are defined in Article 1(1) of Protocol
II as conflicts between state armies and "organized armed groups" which
operate under a responsible command structure and exercise sufficient
control over a portion of a state's territory to enable them to carry out
sustained military operations. 64 Although Protocol II regulates the most
serious and prevalent type of internal conflict, it does not apply to lesser
forms of disorder, such as internal disturbances and tensions, including
riots and isolated or sporadic acts of violence. 65 Article 4(3)(c) of Protocol II provides that in non-international armed conflicts, "children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities." This is an
innovative provision because it contains a total prohibition on participation, including even voluntary enlistment. Children are not to be involved in any military operation, including transportation of ammunition
and foodstuffs or acts of sabotage. 66 The language of the Protocol ascribes responsibility to those who allow children to participate rather
than to the children themselves. 67

61.
Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.; see also Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past; The Implications of
Prosecuting Children for Participating in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REv. 629 (1997).
64. See MONOGRAPH No32, supra note 33; see also Theodore Meron, On the Inadequate
Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 589, 599 (1983); see a/so George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva
Protocols, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS
PRINCIPLES 129 (Swinarski ed., 1984).
65.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art.
1(2), 1125 V.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
66.
Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 4(3)(c); see a/so Reis, supra note 63.
67. See Renteln, supra note 13.
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It is noteworthy that Protocol II is binding on states as well as armed

opposition groups. 68 Protocol II was intended to expand the scope of
protection for victims in internal armed conflicts; unfortunately many
states have not ratified it. Many states also deny that it applies to the conflicts in which they are involved because they claim that the conflicts are
merely internal disturbances. 69 For example, the conflicts in Somalia,
Afghanistan (under the Taliban), and Myanmar do not meet the threshold
requirement of Protocol II. As such, children are being lost in gaps of
existing international laws of war. 70 Since, there is also no body with
authoritative power to declare what is a non-international armed conflict
as opposed to a disturbance. It appears that the determination is left to
the state party.7!
The four Geneva Conventions and the two protocols afford protection to
children in armed conflict in part by specifying age limits. They prohibit
participation by those under fifteen and with regard to fifteen-toeighteen-year-olds, mandate enlisting older children first. 72 International
usage has now settled on an age limit of fifteen as defining what "children" mean when no further description is given. 73 Although these rules
are widely supported, they have not achieved the status of customary
international law. The consensus is not sufficient for purposes of opinio
juris. 74
IHL as defined in the four Geneva Conventions and the two protocols
fails to protect many children from the tragedies of war. Many reasons
account for this failure. First, most of the conflicts involving children are
internal armed conflicts. 75 Second, many states have failed to ratify Protocol II. And last, the relevant norms are not considered part of custom68.
See Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 4(3)(c).
69.
Because Protocol II uses a high threshold of application it enables states to deny that their
internal conflicts are covered. They assert that their conflicts are merely riots or separate acts of
violence. See GUY GOODWIN-GILL & ILENE COHN, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN
ARMED CONFLICTS (1994).
70. See Abbott, supra note 1; see also MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33.
71. See Reis, supra note 63.
72. See Protocol I, supra note 56; see also Protocol II, supra note 65, the protocols specify that
those under 15 should not take a direct part in hostilities or be recruited. Existing standards differ on
whether there should be prohibition of any participation in hostilities by children or whether they
should proscribe only taking a direct part in hostilities. For example, Protocol II, art. 4(3)(c) prohibits any participation. On the other hand, Protocol I, art. 77(2) and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, art. 38(2) forbid only taking a direct part in hostilities.
73.
See JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE IV GENEVA CONVENTION 395(1958); see also
Alex Obote-Odora, Legal Problems of Children in Armed Conflict, (visited April I, 2003)
<http:/www.murdoch.edu.aulelaw/issues/v6n2/obote-Odora62_text.html>.
74.
"Opinio juris" is a subjective component necessary for a usage or practice of States to rise
to the level of international customary law, it must be shown that the usage or practice is adopted as
a matter of legal obligation, rather than prompted by moral rectitude or by force of habit.
75. See Abbott, supra note 1.
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ary international law. 76 These shortcomings of IHL, especially with reference to internal conflicts, have been acknowledged in the international
community and have led to the development of global standards in other
areas. 77
B.

THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

Article 38 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)78addresses recruitment of child soldiers. It provides that:
(1) State Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.
(2) State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that
persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not take a
part in hostilities.
(3) State Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has
not attained the age of 15 years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 15
years but who have not attained the age of 18 years, states parties
shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.
Clearly, Article 38(2) can hardly be said to have settled the problem of
children becoming involved in hostilities. It merely repeats the terms of
article 77(2), with all the ambiguities and failings of that article. 79 Article
38 has been described as an anomaly in using a IS-year age minimum for
child soldiers while in all other respects the CRC's general definitions of
a child is any person below the age of 18. 80 However, states in favour of
the age 18 definition are free to interpret Article 38(2) in light of Article
41 of the CRC, which provides that any conflict between the provisions
of the Convention and obligations under municipal or international law
must be settled in favour of whichever rule gives the child the greatest

76.
Customary international law is that part of international law which is based on the practice
of States, general and consistent, fortified by "opinio juris" as a necessary component, and serves to
complement norms codified in Conventions or Treaties.
77. See, Machel Study, supra note 3.
78. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G ..A. Res. 44125, 44 U.N. G.AOR Supp.
No.49, U.N. Doc. Al44/73 [hereinafter CRC].
79.
If a state is also a party to Protocol II, the Protocol obligations prevail over art. 38 of the
CRC, since art. 41 of the CRC provides that" nothing in the present Convention shall affect any
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child ... " CRC, supra note
78.
80. See Rentein, supra note 13.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/3

12

Madubuike-Ekwe: Children in Armed Conflicts

2005]

CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICTS

41

protection. 81 To this end, when certain states such as Argentina and Austria ratified the CRC, they made special declarations that they would
enforce the age of 18. As such, Article 38 of CRC was considered an
innovation because it based human rights law on humanitarian law. The
CRC applies to all children in all circumstances with the exception only
of the United States and Somalia - the two countries not yet parties to
it. 82
The CRC has two main limitations. First, it generally limits only the
conduct of states while leaving out non-state actors. Secondly, the failure of the United States to ratify the Convention, when virtually all the
other countries in the world have done so, undermines its efficacy. 83
C.

THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE
CHILD

The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is the only
regional treaty in the world which addresses the issues of child soldiers.
It was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1990 and
came into force in November 1999. 84 It is clear and specific. It defines a
"child" as anyone below 18 years of age without exception. 85 Article
22(2) which forbids child soldiers provides:
States parties to the present charter shall take all necessary steps
to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and
refrain in particular, from recruiting any child. 86
It should be noted that the African Charter has stronger language - "take
all necessary steps"87 - than the CRC, which merely asks states to "take
all feasible measures."88
D.

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The Statute of the International Criminal Court established a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC) to try persons charged with commit-

81.
See MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33.
82.
See, Child Soldiers, supra note 43.
83.
See Renteln, supra note 13.
84.
See Charter on The Rights and Welfare of the African Child, July 11, 1990, art. 22(2),
OAU Doc., CABILEG.l24.9/49 (1990) [hereinafter African Charter].
85.
See African Charter, supra note 84, art. 2.
86.
See African Charter, supra note 84.
87.
Id.
88.
See CRC, supra note 78.
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ting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 89 The treaty
gives the ICC jurisdiction over the war crimes of conscripting children
under the age of fifteen into the national armed forces or armed groups,
or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 90 In drafting the treaty,
the delegates agreed that the terms ''using'' and "participate" would prohibit not only children's direct participation in combat, but also their
active participation in military activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, as couriers, or at
military checkpoints. 91 Also prohibited is the use of children in "direct"
support functions such as carrying supplies to the front line. 92
The ICC treaty substantially advances international law relating to the
protection of children in armed conflict and the prosecution of violence
against children. The treaty's list of war crimes includes intentional attacks on educational institutions and schools, among other civilian buildings which have been frequently targeted in recruitment drives or as part
of campaigns to terrorize civilian populations. 93
E.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

The International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted Convention 182,
in June 1999, concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 94 The Convention commits each state
which ratifies it to "take immediate and effective measures to secure the
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter
of urgency."95 The term "child" applies to all persons under 18 years 96
and "the worst forms of child labour" includes, inter alia, "forced or
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict. "97
Recommendation 190, accompanying Convention 182, encourages states
to make such recruitment a criminal offense. This was the first time that
89.

See UN Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.

AlCONF. 183/9,37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC].
90.
See id. art. 2.

91.
See Human Rights Watch, Promises Broken: The International Criminal Court (visited
march 25, 2003) <http:/www.hrw.org/campaignslcrp/promises/icc.htrnI> [hereinafter HRW: Promises Broken].
92. Id.
93.
See id.; In Uganda, the lord's resistance Army, "abducted children from their schools,
communities and homes to camps in Sudan ... forcing them to commit atrocities and become sexual
slaves".
94.
See International Labour Organization Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) (entry into force Nov. 19, 2000)
[hereinafter Convention 182].
95.
See id., supra note 94, art. I.
96.
See id. art. 2.
97.
See id. art. 3(a).
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an 18-year minimum age limit was set in relation to child soldiering in an
international treaty. It was also the first specific, legal recognition of
child soldiering as a form of child labour. 98
F.

THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED
CONFLICT

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on May 25, 2000. 99 It entered
into force on February 12,2002. 100 The Convention raised the minimum
age from 15 to 18 for direct participation in hostilities, for all recruitment
into armed groups, and for compulsory recruitment by governments. 101
However, states may continue to accept volunteers from the age of 16. 102
On becoming parties to the Protocol, states have to deposit a binding
declaration setting out their minimum voluntary recruitment age and the
safeguards they have adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not
forced or coerced. l03 They also have to maintain standards to ensure as a
minimum, that the recruitment is genuinely voluntary, with the informed
consent of the recruits' parents or legal guardians, and that the recruit is
fully informed of the duties involved in the military service and provides
reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service. 104
These declarations may be strengthened at any time but not weakened.
In other words, a declaration can only be withdrawn in favour of a declaration specifying a higher minimum voluntary recruitment age into the
government armed forces, and not a lower one. 105
In relation to armed groups, there is no requirement in the Optional Protocol that such groups are involved in armed conflict. This means that
98. See Appendix 3. International Legal Protection for Children in Armed Conflict, (visited
April
3,
2003)
<http:/www.childsoldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsflf30d8b5e33403aI802SaeS003812 I 3/7945ef> [hereinafter Appendix
3].

99. See Human Rights Watch, Child Soldiers and the Child Labor Convention (background
briefing)
(June
IS,
1999)
(visited
Mar.
IS,
2003)
<http:/www.hrw.org/background/crp/labor6IS.htm> [hereinafter HRW Child Soldiers]; see also
Human Rights Watch, Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (visited Jan. 27, 2005)
<http:/www.hrw.org/carnpaigns/crp/ratifications.htm>;seealso.Child Soldiers, supra note 43.
100. See HRW Child Soldiers, supra note 99.
101. See, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. AlRES/S4/263 (2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
102. See Appendix 3, supra note 98.
103. See Optional Protocol, supra note 101, art. 3(2).
104. See id. art. 3(3).
105. See id.; see also HRW Child Soldiers, supra note 99.
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questions about whether or not a situation amounts to an armed conflict
are irrelevant and that recruitment prior to the start of a conflict is covered. Furthermore, there is an obligation incumbent on all state parties to
the Protocol to take all feasible measures to prevent recruitment and use
of children under the age of 18 by armed groups including legal measures to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 106
V.

THE UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States opposes international efforts to raise the minimum age
for recruitment and participation in armed conflict from the current fifteen to eighteen. lo7 The U.S. position is based on U.S. recruitment practices, which allows seventeen-year-olds to enlist voluntarily for military
service with parental permission.108 The U.S. position also stems from
its reluctance to amend U.S. domestic laws and practice into compliance
with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional
Protocols along with the CRC. The U.S. also fears that establishing
eighteen as the minimum age for participation in hostilities would provide evidence of customary international law because of the consistency
with existing international norms. 109
The United States further opposes the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) I lOon the grounds that it may exercise its jurisdiction to conduct politically motivated investigations and prosecution of
the U.S. military and political officials and personnel. III The U.S. specifically opposed the inclusion of the use of child soldiers in international
armed conflict as a war crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC. IIZ Instead of supporting an effective international court that will punish violators for crimes against humanity and for war crimes, the U.S. continues
106. See Optional Protocol, supra note 101, art. 3(2).
107. The United States ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Anned Conflict on December 23, 2002; see Amnesty International, Child Soldiers and the West Asian Crisis (2001) (visited April I, 2003)
<http:/www.amnestyusa.orglchildrenlsoldierslwesasiancrisis.html> (discussing that the U.S accepts
volunteers from the age of 17 years and until now has deployed 17 year olds in operations such as
the Gulf War 1991, Somalia, and Bosnia).
108. See Abbott, supra note I; see also HRW: Child Soldiers, supra note 99 (stating that according to Department of Defense Statistics, there are less than 7000 minors in the U.S. armed
services, making up less than one·half of one percent of the total 1.5 million active duty force, and
only 45 of new active duty recruits each year).
109. See Abbott, supra note 1.
110.
See ICC, supra note 89; see also, HR W: Promise Broken, supra note 91.
111. See Philippe J. Sands, The Future a/International Adjudication, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,4;
see also Human Rights Watch, ICC: The United States and the International Criminal Court, (visited April 14, 2003) <http://www.hrw.orglcampaigns/icc/us.htm> [hereinafter HRW: The u.s. and
ICC].
112. See Abbott, supra note 1.
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to undennine international efforts to provide special protection for children. Consequently, on May 6, 2002, the U.S. withdrew its signature on
the ICC treaty. 113
However, the U.S. Congress recently adopted a congressional resolution
condemning the use of child soldiers in its Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1999Y4 The U.S Senate also, by a unanimous consent, voted to support ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Anned
Conflice l5 and consequently, ratified it on December 23, 2002.116 Although the resolution does not bind the U.S., it constitutes a significant
step in the right direction. Yet, it should be noted that the US failure to
ratify Protocol I, CRC and the ICC deprived the world of a common
framework for humanitarian rules governing anned conflicts.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES GOVERNING
CHILD SOLDIERS
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that, there exist various treaties

that prohibit the use of children in anned conflict. Unfortunately, problems remain with the effectiveness and enforceability of these rules of
law. As a consequence, children remain vulnerable to the tragic effects
of anned conflict.
The problem is compounded by the inability of the international community to agree on the age of recruitment and participation of a child in
armed conflict. This allows states to pick and choose when a young person is a child or an adult, for a purpose subjectively detennined by the
state. Their purpose is "good" or "bad" depending on which side you are
on.
The Geneva Convention obliges State parties to prosecute violators of
the Convention. However, the Fourth Geneva Convention does not specifically provide for a crime that would cover the recruitment of child
soldiers.ll7 Protocol I does regulate recruitment of children but the activity is not mentioned in the description of "grave breaches."118 As such,
the use of children as combatants is clearly in breach of Protocol I, but is
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See, HRW: The US and ICC, supra note 111.
See Abbott, supra note 1.
See Amnesty International, supra note 107.
See id.
See Protocol I, supra note 56.
See id. art. 85.
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not a criminal action attracting individual liability. For example, The
Democratic Republic of Congo is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, but the government can not prosecute individuals
responsible for recruiting child soldiers. This is because the treaties do
not contemplate this practice as a "grave breach" and therefore an international crime. In addition, neither the Convention nor Protocol I apply
to the type of internal struggle being waged in the country. The Fourth
Convention applies only to International Conflicts, and Protocol I to
struggles of self-determination. 119 Furthermore, some states are reluctant
to prosecute or extradite suspects in their territories. There is no international police force with authority to arrest offenders hiding in such states
and the principle Sovereignty of States precludes any concerned state
from making the arrest itself. 120
The cultural difference in the conceptualization of childhood further hinders the ban on the use of children in armed conflict. 121 In many societies the distinction between childhood and adulthood is not clearcut. In
some parts of Africa, 16 and 17 year old children from pastoral culture
are expected to bear arms and fight - that being the only way to be initiated into adulthood. 122 This rite of passage takes place soon after puberty. In this culture, with or without law, children will always bear arms
and join national armies or guerilla groups. 123 In other states, such as
Rwanda, 17 year olds are no longer considered children. Individuals
marry younger and are expected to contribute to the survival of the family from an early age. 124
The problem of implementation, enforcement and compliance with international rule is exacerbated where United Nations Peacekeepers are deployed to stabilize conflict situations and to enforce compliance with
international law.125 Instead of protecting children, the United Nations
Peacekeepers exchange money, employment, goods or services for sex
with girls they were meant to protect. 126

119. See MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33.
120. See id.
121. See Obote-Odora, supra note 73.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mission Statement (visited
Jan. 27, 2005) <http://www.U.N.org/depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm>.
126. See Jonathan Wald, u.N. Accuses Force of Sex Abuse, Sexual Abuse of Girls in Congo
(visited
Jan.
27,
2005)
Continues,
<http://cnn.com/2005/worldiafrica/01l08/congo.peacekeeper.sexi>; see Marc Lacey, In Congo War,
Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.28, 2004) (visited on Jan. 12, 2005)
<http://www.Nytimes.com/> (portraying how a young girl, a frail fifth grader describes the tent
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VII. CONCLUSION
Given the obstacles to enforcement of humanitarian and human rights
laws with regard to the use of children in armed conflicts, the establishment of the ICC would help in discouraging individuals from recruiting
underage children into the army and hopefully minimize the participation
of children in armed conflict. 127 Since most states are already in breach
of the age limit on recruitment provided in the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child 128 and there are no "police" to
enforce these international rules, the international community should
direct their efforts to the issue of forced recruitment of children. This is
more fundamental than the issue of age limit as it cuts across both sides
of the divide. Even if the states insist on using children in armed conflicts, the children should, at least, not be forced to fight. 129
The international community should address the root causes of conflicts
more than the instruments used in the conflict. If the root cause of a conflict is identified and settled, the problem of child soldiers will be solved.
But if the root cause of the conflict is not identified and solved, the conflict will crop up again and children may be forced to fight again. 130
The international community must work collectively to update existing
rules of international law to reflect the increased participation of children
in hostilities and to initiate the necessary enforcement and rehabilitation
mechanisms. 131 The first step is to increase the visibility of the problem.132 In the case of child soldiers, the United Nations Security Council
where a UN peacekeeper had forced himself on her. The UN soldier had used a cup of milk to lure
her into bed.); see also Susannah Price, DR Congo Sex Abuse Claims Upheld (visited Jan. 19,2005)
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uklmpapps/pagetools/printlnews.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africa/4> (explaining how
the UN watchdog, the office of Oversight Services, investigated the allegations of sexual abuse in
the Northeast Congolese town of Bunya. The probe found a pattern of sexual exploitation of women
and children, which it said was continuing. T he report also said that many of the victims were under
18 with some as young as 13. They were usually given food or small sums of money in return for
sex).
127.
The first ever war crimes prosecution for using child soldiers was launched in June 2004
by the international tribunal in Sierra Leone. Prosecutors for the International Criminal Court in The
Hague are also investigating the use of child soldiers in Uganda and Congo, but charges have yet to
be laid. See Mike Crawley, New Push to Stop Child Soldiers, (visited on Jan.12, 2005)
<http://www.Csmonitor.coml20Q4/1118/p06s02-woaf.htm> .
128.
See id. (governments that use child soldiers include Burma, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda).
129.
See id. (stating that the United States has used l7-year-olds in Iraq, but later withdrew
them).
130.
Some of the root causes of conflicts are ethnic rivalry, political power struggle, selfdetermination, resource control, genocide, religious differences etc.
131.
See. Isebil/ v. Gruhn. Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Local Problems. Global Obligations, I HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 73 (Oct.-Dec. 1999).
132. See id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

19

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 3

48

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. XI

has passed a series of resolutions condemning the recruitment and use of
children in hostilities. 133 The appointment of Olara Otunnu, as the
United Nations Special Representative on Children and Anned Conflict
is a step in the right direction. 134 Hopefully, increased visibility will help
shape public opinion to change the climate and reduce outside assistance
to groups that use child soldiers. 135 It could also put their victories at risk
because of outside pressure and lack of support and recognition. 136 Finally, the international community should also prohibit or sanction companies or states that sell arms to conflict zones.137 Restricting arms supplies to conflict zones will no doubt reduce armed conflict and encourage
negotiations to end the conflict. 138

133.
The UN Security Council passed resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000),1379 (2001),1460
(2003) and 1539 (2004) on children and armed conflict. These resolutions can be found at the UN
Security Council website.
134. See Olara Otunnu, supra note 2.
135. See Gruhn, supra note 131.
136. See id.
137. See THE SMALL ARMs SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK, A PROJECT OF THE GRADUATE
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GENEVA. The survey explores the linkages between the
abuse of human rights and the widespread proliferation, availability, and use of small arms. It examines the impact of arms exports to states that violate human rights, the role of weapons in violence
and crime around the world, and the implementation of human rights standards by police forces
around the world.
138. See Amnesty International and Oxfam, Shattered Lives: The case for Tough Arms Control
(visited Jan. 27, 2005) <http://www.amnestyusa.orglarms_tradelcontrolarms_summary.html> (explaining that uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by government forces and armed groups
takes a massive human toll in lost lives, lost livelihoods, and lost opportunities to escape poverty.
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